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Review Essay

Revisiting Cartographic Anxiety
DEBATING DIFFERENCE: GROUP RIGHTS AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN
INDIA, by Rochana Bajpai I
MAPPING CITIZENSHIP IN INDIA, by Anupama Roy 2
THE DOMESTIC ABROAD: DIASPORAS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
by Latha Varadarajan 3
4
RAHUL RAO

IN1994, SANKARAN KRISHNA coined the term "cartographic anxiety" to describe
a persistent neurosis that seemed to mark Indian practices of state and nation
building.' To anyone who had occasion to open an atlas in India in the first
half-century of its postcolonial existence, this neurosis would have been evident
in the rubber stamp that Customs Department officials doggedly impressed upon
the pages of any foreign publication that dared to represent the effective boundaries
between India and its neighbours, Pakistan and China, rather than those the
Indian state claimed for itself. The stamp read, "The external boundaries of
India as depicted are neither accurate nor authentic." For Krishna, the term
"cartography" encompasses all those representational practices that, in various
ways, have attempted to inscribe something called 'India' and to endow that
entity with content, history, meaning, and purpose, taking within its ambit not
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only the drawing of lines on a map but also the frequently bloody and coercive
processes by which those lines are socially produced and made effective. 6 Krishna
understands India's cartographic anxiety as stemming both from the peculiar
circumstances of its birth-its creation-by-amputation in the bloody events of
Partition-but also as "a facet of a larger postcolonial anxiety: of a society suspended
forever in the space between the 'former colony' and 'not-yet-nation."'' It is this
state of suspension, he argues, that fuels the obsession on the part of the
postcolony to approximate a historical origin that never existed, except as
the telos of the narrative of modernity: "[P]ostcoloniality may be defined as a
condition marked by the perpetual effort of colonized societies to catch up with
the putative pasts and presents of colonizing societies who anyway do not accept
that they are in a race. '
Nearly two decades after this still widely cited article was written, the state of
suspension that Krishna describes may seem unrecognizable to the casual reader.
Analyses of India as a "rising power" wax eloquently about its military strength,
its status as the largest arms importer in the world, its possession of nuclear
weapons-now accorded US approval,9 its position as the third-largest economy
in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms"i with a growth rate that is projected to
remain robust relative to those of developed economies even in a time of global
recession,II and the endurance of its democratic institutions. More sober analyses
point to the daunting challenges with which India grapples on a daily basis: a
growing gap between rich and poor, larger absolute numbers of poor than in all
of sub-Saharan Africa, 2 left-wing violence from the Maoist Naxalite movement,
the ever-present threat (and sporadically realized actuality) of religious fundamentalism

6.
7.
8.
9.

10.

11.

12.

Ibid at 508.
Ibid at 508-09.
Ibid at 517.
Office of the Press Secretary, Press Release, "Joint Statement Between President George W
Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh" (18 July 2005) online: <http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html>.
Devika Banerji & Rishi Shah, "India overtakes Japan to become thirdlargest economy in purchasing power parity," The Economic Times (19 April
2012), online: <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-04-19/
news/313678381 _ppp-terms-india-s-gdp-power-parity>.
IMF Survey Online, "India's Growth Slowdown Calls for Reinvigorated Reforms," IMF
Survey Magazine (17 April 2012), online: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey
so/2012/car041712a.htm>.
Jason Burke, "More of world's poor live in India than in all sub-Saharan Africa, says study,"
The Guardian (14 July 2010), online: <http://www.guardian.co.uklworld/2010/jul/14/
poverty-india-africa-oxford>.

REVIEW ESSAY

577

and communal violence, systemic corruption and infrastructural bottlenecks that
threaten to impede growth, unresolved secessionist struggles in Kashmir and the
Northeast, tensions with Pakistan and China, and the instability created by the
Afghan war in South Asia more generally. Yet, whichever 'India analysts choose to see,
as Ramachandra Guha-one of the country's foremost public intellectuals-notes,
the question that typically animates them is not whether India will survive but
whether it will become a superpower) 3 The India of today continues to remain
forever suspended, but the possibilities between which it dangles are less those
of "former colony and not-yet-nation" than "troubled nation and great power."
Indeed, this image of perpetual suspension is corroborated by the portrayal of
4
India as "always emerging but never quite arriving."
At the heart of the three books reviewed here is the notion of citizenshipa paradigmatic cartographic practice demarcating insiders from outsiders and
defining the membership of the body politic. Delineating changing trends in
understandings and practices of citizenship over the life of the republic, all three
books allow us to revisit the question of cartographic anxiety, to consider the
forms in which it manifests itself, and ultimately to pose the question of whether
greater power alleviates cartographic anxiety. Indeed, this is itself simply a reformulation of the enduring question in international relations of whether greater
power brings greater security.
Anupama Roy's book, Mapping Citizenship in India, might be read as a
biography of The Citizenship Act, 1955,5 as the author investigates the politics
surrounding its inception before exploring the debates that attended key amendments
in 1986, 2003, and 2005. Although Roy sets out to mark moments of both
inclusion and exclusion in the trajectory of Indian citizenship, the book in fact
tells a story that is overwhelmingly weighted in favour of the latter. One sees here
a notion of citizenship, originally moored in the idea ofjus soli whereby rights
of citizenship follow from birth within the territory of the state, becoming
increasingly informed by the doctrine ofjus sanguiniswhereby citizenship follows
from blood ties and descent. This change is starkly evident in the rules governing
citizenship by birth, which, at the commencement of the CitizenshipAct in 1955,
accorded citizenship to virtually everyone born within the territory of India (with
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some exceptions)16 but have subsequently become more restrictive. In addition to
birth within the territory of the state, the 1986 amendment required that at least
one parent be a citizen of India. i" The 2003 amendment conferred citizenship by
birth only where both parents were citizens or where one parent was a citizen and
the other not an illegal migrant at the time of the child's birth, 18 offering a clear
indication of the jealousy with which the Indian state guards privileges of citizenship
and the nature of the anxiety underpinning it. 9
Ethno-cultural practices and understandings of citizenship have been
significant from the inception of the citizenship regime. Roy describes a liminal
period between the coming into force of the Constitution ofIndia (Constitution)2"
in 1950 and the promulgation of the CitizenshipAct in 1955 when governmental
authorities in both India and Pakistan had to deal with and assess the citizenship
claims of a range of people crossing the new border: children, prisoners, and most
extraordinarily, women who had been abducted in the course of Partition-related
violence and had found themselves in the 'wrong' country. The exchange of these
women, frequently carried out with no regard to their stated wishes, was considered
a task essential to the consummation of both nations because of its unstated
contribution to the restoration of izzat, or male honour.2 1 Decisions about the
claims of these liminal subjects were informed by a range of considerations,
including the nature and direction of movement, the intention with which it was
imbued, and-crucially-the identity of the migrant. In an historical context
still dominated by the memory of the brutality of Partition, Roy argues that
judgments about loyalty-frequently derived from religion-were the primary
basis for executive discretion, exception, and arbitrariness, even where the letter
of the law permitted admission into citizenship.22
Rather than eroding the ethno-cultural substrate of cartographic anxiety, the
passage of time seems only to have furnished updated justifications for it in the
context of a post-September 11 ("9/11") world. Nor is such anxiety the preserve
of the majoritarian institutions of government-the executive and legislaturewhich might be expected to reflect social chauvinisms and neuroses. Among the
16. Ibid, s 3(a).
17. Ibid,s 3(b), as amended by Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1986, No 51 of 1986, India Code.
18. This concept is common in civil law jurisdictions, however. Citizenship Act, supra note 15,
s 3(c)(i)-(ii), as amended by Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003, No 6 of 2004, India Code
[Citizenship(Amendment) Act, 2003].
19. Roy, supra note 2 at 133-34.
20. India Const, 1950 [India Const].
21. Roy, supra note 2 at 43-44, 61.
22. Ibidat 91.
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most interesting sections of Roy's book are those that detail battles over citizenship
in two of India's northeastern states, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, of which the
former is particularly illustrative of these dynamics. When an ethnic Assamese
movement began protesting the entry of 'illegal aliens' from Bangladesh in the
1980s, the Congress government at the Union (i.e., federal) level, wary of yet
another regional challenge to its dominance, sought to delegitimize the movement
in a variety of ways, including by portraying these anxieties as specifically
Assamese and not national. Among other things, the Union government passed
the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 (IMDT Act), a
piece of legislation that made the process of identifying illegal migrants more
onerous by shifting the burden of proving illegality on to the person alleging it23
(thereby modifying the existing procedure for identification and deportation of
illegal aliens specified by 7he ForeignersAct, 1946, which required the alleged
illegal alien to prove his or her legality).24 In doing so, the Union government
sought both to assert its exclusive prerogative to legislate on issues of citizenship
and to wrest the moral high ground from the Assamese movement by posing as
the guardian of immigrants' human rights. The constitutionality of the IMDT
Act was challenged by the Assamese politician Sarbananda Sonowal, who argued
that it discriminated against Assamese citizens by specifying distinct procedures
for dealing with immigration into the state, thus making it impossible for them
to detect and to deport foreigners from their soil. Among the numerous affidavits
filed by various interested parties was one by the National Democratic Alliance
(NDA), led by the Hindu right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which dwelt
at length on the dangers that illegal immigration of Muslims from Bangladesh
posed to national security. In defending the constitutionality of the Act, the
Congress asserted that it had the effect of protecting Indian citizens from the
harassment of opportunistic allegations of illegality."
In 2005, the Supreme Court declared the IMDTAct unconstitutional on
grounds that its exceptional application to Assam was discriminatory and took
issue with shifting the onus of proof onto the authority charged with detection
and deportation of foreigners.26 The Court shifted the burden of proof back on
to the suspect-a move that had the effect of undermining the presumption of
innocence. The Court justified this legal regime of suspicion on the grounds of
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restoring state sovereignty, which it claimed was diminished by the IMDTAc's
effective deprivation of the Union government's capacity to expel foreigners who
violated the Citizenship Act. It also spoke of restoring to the Union government
its constitutional duty of protecting the state from external aggression-an
observation that effectively construed immigration from Bangladesh as not merely
illegal but as an act of aggression. As Roy notes, in the court's exposition, "the
constituent outsider was marked not only on account of being a foreigner, but
also on account of being a Muslim, the latter inevitably associated with Islamic
fundamentalism, as well as a threat to the nation (read Hindu) and its security.""
Although Roy does not mention it, this ruling was not the first time that an
agency of the Government of India had construed migration from Bangladesh as
aggression. In the entirely different context of the 1971 war with what was then
East Pakistan, India's ambassador to the United Nations, seeking to justify its
use of force against Pakistan, initially drew attention to the plight of the citizens
28
of East Pakistan, ten million of whom had fled across the border into India.
Finding insufficient diplomatic support for this proto-humanitarian intervention
argument-made in the context of the Cold War when there was little, if any,
support for the notion that force could be used in defence of the human rights of
the citizens of another state-the ambassador quickly changed his position to the
more conventional one of self-defence against the wave of "refugee aggression"
confronting his country.29 Even as it sought to present itself as the liberator of the
new state of Bangladesh, India has construed the people of that state as aggressors
from the moment of Bangladesh's inception. If the argument was first made for
legalistic reasons, it has taken on more substantive and sinister connotations in
the post-9/11 conjuncture, informed as it is by panics concerning terrorism and
Islamist fundamentalism.
As should be evident by now, Indian discourses of citizenship have been
haunted by the figure of the migrant whose relationship to the citizen is, in Roy's
view, not so much one of exclusion or opposition as "foreclusion"-a situation in
which the outsider is presented discursively and constitutively in delineations of citizenship." The outsider is a constant referent, indispensable for the identification of,
and inextricably tied to, the citizen without fully being able to reproduce herself

27.
28.
29.
30.

Roy, supra note 2 at 116.
UNHCR, The State of the WorMs Refugees 2000: Fifty Years ofHumanitarianAction (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000) at 59.
Nicholas J Wheeler, Saving Strangers:HumanitarianIntervention in InternationalSociety
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 61.
Roy, supra note 2 at 5-6.
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as one.31 But the migrant is a multivalent figure, and there is at least one kind of
migrant who appears to have been admitted into citizenship in a rare expansion of
Indian conceptions of national belonging: Persons of Indian Origin (PlO) abroad
who.are granted Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI). The puzzle of how and why
this happened is the subject of Latha Varadarajan's book, The Domestic Abroad.
Beginning in the year 2000, successive Union governments have taken steps
to institutionalize the relationship between the Indian state and its diasporaa phenomenon that Varadarajan describes as the production of a "domestic
abroad." In 2003, on the initiative of the NDA government, Parliament passed
The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003, which conferred overseas Indian citizenship
on PLOs from sixteen countries in North America, Europe, and Australasia 2 (the
choice of these countries led cynical observers to characterize the initiative as an
exercise in cultivating "dollar and pound citizenship"33 ). With the exception of
the right to participate in electoral politics, PlOs were granted a range of rights
(visa-free travel, residence, investment, and land and property acquisition) that
had previously been available only to resident and non-resident Indian (NRI)
citizens." The following year, the new Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
government established a Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, and in 2005 the Citizenship Act was amended to extend overseas citizenship to all PIOs who either had
been or were eligible to become Indian citizens "at the commencement of the India
constitution," so long as their host countries permitted dual citizenship."5 This reference to the Constitutionimplies that citizens of Pakistan and what is now Bangladesh
are not eligible for overseas Indian citizenship, thereby reinscribing the cartographic
anxiety that has, as we have seen, marked Indian citizenship since its inception.
The state's acute interest in the diaspora at this conjuncture was a novel and
unprecedented development, incongruous with its relative disinterest in overseas
Indians for much of its postcolonial history. Indeed, in the first few decades after
independence, the state oscillated between benign neglect and outright suspicion
of Indians who settled abroad, refusing to champion their interests when their
presence was resented by majority communities in their host countries. This attitude
seems to have stemmed from core principles of Nehruvian foreign policy: a fierce
commitment to mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity---especially
31. Ibid at 3-4.
32. Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003, supra note 18 at s 2(1)(ee)(i)-(ii), (gg), Schedule IV.
33. C Rammanohar Reddy, "Citizenship with dollars and pounds," The Hindu (19 January
2003), online: <http://www.hindu.com/mag/2003/01/19/stories/2003011900230300.htm>.
34. Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003, supra note 18 at s 7(b)(ii).
35. Varadarajan, supra note 3 at 138; The Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2005, No 75 of 2005,
India Code at s 7(a).
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where other postcolonial states were concerned-coupled with a keenness to
assuage regional concerns about Indian dominance. In practice, this meant that
the government would not intervene to defend the interests of Indians in what
were then Ceylon and Burma. The anti-imperialist commitments of Nehruvian
foreign policy left the government rather unsympathetic to the plight of Indians
adversely affected by the policies of postcolonial East African states. While condemning
the most severe instances of persecution, such as Idi Amin's expulsion of Ugandan
Asians, the government of India generally held the view that overseas Indians
had brought this state of affairs upon themselves through their history of imperial
collaboration and failure to make common cause with Africans in their host
countries (this latter view was a polite way of referencing the racist and exploitative
ways in which Indian communities tended to relate to black Africans).36
In explaining the dramatic reversal of the state's attitude towards the overseas
Indian, Varadarajan's central argument is that the neoliberal restructuring of the
Indian state-a process that began in the 1980s-necessitated and made possible
the diasporic reimagining of the nation.3 ' At the core of the author's thesis is an
argument about the strategies deployed by the Indian bourgeoisie to construct
and maintain hegemony, an endeavour that entails representing their particular
interests as coincident with those of the nation. In the years immediately
preceding independence, the dominant faction of the Indian bourgeoisie
sought to accomplish this by dissociating themselves from the departing
colonial authorities and making common cause with the Congress right-wing.
As articulated by leading industrialists such as G. D. Birla and Purshotamdas
Thakurdas, this position of enlightened self-interest maintained that the threat of
communism was best averted by attacking the conditions of poverty in which it
tended to take root.38 This led the capitalist writers of the 1945 "Bombay Plan"
to endorse many elements of Nehruvian socialism, particularly the notion of
a strongly interventionist state that would abolish feudalism, liquidate rural
indebtedness, and, more generally, occupy the commanding heights of the
economy in the interests of propelling India's industrial development and
reducing its dependence on foreign capital. This understanding of bourgeois
interests also led Indian capitalists to endorse the nationalization of banks and insurance companies as well as the establishment of state financial institutions that
would fund indigenous industrial production. For three-and-a-half decades
after independence, a relatively stable compact between the state and the bout36. Ibidat75-77.
37. Ibidat 17.
38. Varadarajan, supra note 3, at 83.
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geoisie prevailed in which the state would finance companies and protect them
from foreign competition without interfering in their management.3 9
As economic performance began to stagnate in the 1950s, mired in what
was notoriously described by economists as the "Hindu rate of growth," the first
cracks in this compact became evident. Successive foreign exchange crises forced
the government to approach the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for bailouts.
Mindful of the experience of the 1960s-when IMF conditionality had aroused
domestic opposition across the entire political spectrum, making the required
reforms impossible to implement and resulting in a loss of credibility in international
financial markets-the government adopted a very different approach in the
1980s. It launched a pre-emptive structural adjustment program even before
approaching the IMF for a loan, presenting this as something it had done of its
own volition and rather than under IMF pressure. One element of the program
was the NRI Portfolio Investment Scheme introduced in the 1982 budget, which
permitted investment in the shares of companies registered in Indian stock exchanges
by "non-residents of Indian nationality or origin," as well as by corporations
that were at least 60 per cent owned by such individuals.41 This scheme assumes
particular importance in understanding the neoliberal restructuring of the state
because it is clear, in retrospect, that it was the first sign of the liberalization of
Indian capital markets. The government justified the scheme on grounds that
it would give Indian companies access to a valuable source of capital, implicitly
acknowledging that the project of an aspiring autonomous national bourgeoisie
had failed. The opposition agreed with the diagnosis but not with the cure,
arguing that opening the door to foreign investment would undermine national
sovereignty and would potentially allow multinational corporations to take over
Indian firms through the agency of NRIs. In her astute analysis of the legislative
debates attending this controversy Varadarajan demonstrates how the government
sought to allay the sovereignty concerns (read: cartographic anxiety) of the
opposition by constructing the NRI or the PIO as viable alternative sources of
much-needed capital that were preferable to the IMF. 1 In other words, playing
up the "Indianness" of the NRI/PIO allowed the government to present this
neoliberal restructuring as a case of the state reaching out to the nation abroad
rather than as an abject surrender to foreign capital.
Many of these arguments were reprised in the discussion around the 1991
budget, which tends to be remembered as heralding a more radical round of neoliberal
39. Ibidat 88.
40.

Ibid at 94.

41.

IbidatlO0.
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restructuring that sought to downsize the state and invite greater foreign
investment. By this time, the bourgeoisie itself was split between a faction
comprising older, more traditional firms that had been dependent on, and continued to
desire, state protection from foreign competition, and a newly dominant faction
run by professionals and entrepreneurs in the technologically advanced sectors
of the economy who favoured faster and deeper liberalization. Having broken
with the foundational compact between the state and the old bourgeoisie, this
new faction faced the challenge of constructing a new hegemony that would link
further liberalization with the national interest. As Varadarajan explains:
If economic liberalization was not to be seen as an instrumental and calculated
attempt by factions of the bourgeoisie to maintain and perpetuate their privileged
status, if it was to be sustainable over a longer period of time, then what was needed
was a way to make it seem like an essential step in the path of national progress ...
what was needed was a subject who could plausibly embody national aspirations, the
2
potential for India to succeed in the global economy.4

It is in this context that the hailing of the diaspora and the valorization of the figure
of the Indian abroad assume particular importance. The success of the Indian
abroad was invoked to demonstrate what Indians were capable of when liberated
from the stifling requirements of bureaucratic red tape (such as the now-vilified
Nehruvian "license-permit raj" 43). Moreover, homing in on the very apprehensions that underpin cartographic anxiety, proponents of liberalization argued
that protectionism reflected an inferiority complex that was no longer warranted.
India had reached a stage of development where it could welcome, rather than
fear, foreign investment: The success of the Indian abroad was ample proof, this
new bourgeoisie insisted, that Indians were second to none on the world stage."
If the 1991 budget inaugurated a rhetorical blurring of the distinction between
NRIs and PIOs, the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003 institutionalized it by
granting the latter virtually all of the rights that the former had held by virtue
of their continued possession of Indian citizenship while living abroad. This
amalgamation of statuses into a category defined only by ethno-cultural markers
reinforces the general trend towards citizenship based on blood and descent that
Roy chronicles so insightfully. Together with the continued exclusion of PI0s in
Pakistan and Bangladesh from the possibility of overseas Indian citizenship, the
42. Ibid at 110.
43. The phrase refers to the elaborate regime of licenses and permits that governed the
establishment and regulation of business in post-independence India till the advent of
economic liberalization in the early 1990s.
44. Varadarajan, supra note 3 at 128.
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'hailing of the diaspora, while purporting to allay the cartographic anxieties that
expressed themselves in response to the impending entry of foreign capital, has
in effect re-inscribed them. Considering that the Indian state now accords greater
rights to a PIO who might never have set foot in the country than, say, a Bangladeshi
migrant who has lived and worked in it for several decades, it is tempting to draw
parallels with the Zionist project, wedded to a deterritorialized conception of its
ethnos and less concerned with existing for all the people living within it.
Varadarajan's book will also appeal to readers with no particular interest in India
insofar as it makes a number of interesting arguments about the place of diasporas in
contemporary international relations. In particular, many will find it a convincing riposte
to some of the more facile celebrations of diasporas as harbingers of a postnational
consciousness .4 Varadarajan's account of the diaspora as a "domestic abroad"
reveals it to be a form of transnationalism produced through state policies and
initiatives rather than simply a formation that challenges state and national
identities. Yet the flip side of this emphasis on state production is that the
diaspora itself remains rather voiceless in her narrative. With the exception of
Swraj Paul, the British businessman whose acquisition of shares in Indian companies
provoked the legislative debates over the NRI Portfolio Investment Scheme, we
have very little sense of how the diaspora responded to being hailed by the state
or whether it did any hailing of its own.
In a methodological sense, Rochana Bajpai is determined not to write the
sort of book that Varadarajan has. If Varadarajan tends to account for political
rhetoric in terms of the social interests that it furthers, Bajpai insists that there is
value in separating an analysis of the form of political rhetoric from an exposition
of the functions that it performs. She suggests that abstracting from the historical
context of political rhetoric and bracketing-off questions of function will give us
a more accurate grasp of the intricacies of form, a more nuanced view of change,
and ultimately a better understanding of political power. If ideologies attempt
to fix the meanings of concepts, then analyzing the success or failure of attempts
to change those meanings can tell us something about the construction and
breakdown of political hegemony.4 In this sense, Bajpai, like Varadarajan, wants
to discuss the question of hegemony, only less comprehensively and in greater
depth. She is candid in acknowledging that she is only interested in part of a
story that is worth telling-ideas by themselves do not explain outcomes-but
nonetheless insists that there is value in providing a conceptual and ideological,
45.
46.

Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: CulturalDimensions of Globalization(Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1996) at 21.
Bajpai, supra note 1 at 14.
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as distinguished from an institutional or sociological, account of political
hegemony." The emphasis on the political isolates questions about the social
relations of power. Bajpai does not doubt the importance of such inquiries, but
chooses not to take them on in this particular work. This narrowed scope gives
Debating Difference an exhaustiveness and depth that will likely make it the
definitive work on its chosen topic.
Although I have been discussing citizenship as a paradigmatic cartographic
practice dividing insiders from outsiders, insiders are themselves differentiated
along myriad axes based on material inequality and social distinctions. In this
sense, citizenship might be seen as throwing a fictive cloak of equality over
differently situated agents, yet these very differences can make the promise of
citizenship less accessible to some than others. It is in this context that
practices of differentiated citizenship have arisen, in which members of particular
religious, racial, ethnic, linguistic, and other groups are incorporated into citizenship
not only as individuals, but also on the basis of their group membership4 8 In her
account of the origins and subsequent trajectories of group rights in India, Bajpai argues
that the discourse on group rights has been conducted in a legitimating vocabulary,
comprising a set of interlinked political concepts: secularism, democracy, social
justice, national unity, and development. The evolution of this discourse is best
understood in terms of changes in the inter-linkage and relative priority of these
concepts in relation to one another. 9 Bajpai's narrative is structured around
two historical periods: the late 194 0s (the time of the drafting of the Indian
Constitution), which she identifies as a moment of group rights containment; and
the late 1980s, when the constitutional resolution of group rights was challenged
and renegotiated.
Three developments are striking about the constitutional resolution of
group rights: first, the abolition of colonial-era political safeguards for religious
minorities; second, the provision of religious, cultural, and educational rights for
such minorities; and third, the granting of political safeguards for the so-called
Untouchable or Scheduled Caste groups.5" In an argument that alerts us to the
powerful hold of cartographic anxiety and its ubiquity in the early years of
independence, Bajpai maintains that the drafters of the Constitution took a dim
view of political safeguards for .religious minorities (such as the regime of
separate electorates that had been implemented by the British colonial authorities)
47.
48.
49.
50.

Ibidat 20-21.
Roy, supra note 2 at 18.
Bajpai, supra note 1 at 14-15.
Ibid at 46, 88, 110.
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because of the primacy of national unity in the legitimating vocabulary of
the time." This unity was thought to have been fractured by the colonial
government's recognition of religious differences--a move attributed to the colonizer's
desire to keep the colonized divided and which ultimately culminated in Partition.
The primacy of national unity in the legitimating vocabulary meant that all the
other concepts were construed in ways conducive to the putative requirements of
such unity. Thus, secularism was understood as the non-recognition of religious
differences in political life; justice as the identical treatment of all individuals;
development as the prioritization of the modern idea of nationhood over
atavistic identities of religion, caste, and tribe; and democracy as rendering the
social identity of representatives irrelevant. Religious, cultural, and educational
rights for religious minorities survived the test of national unity in the course
of these debates because the particular conception of secularism favoured at the
time allowed for the recognition of religious identities in a private individual and
associational capacity, even if not in the political sphere. These were construed as
rights that would be exercised by religious minorities on their own initiative with
no entitlement to state support. 2
In contrast, political safeguards were endorsed for the Scheduled Castes
because they were seen as mechanisms to diminish disadvantage and difference
rather than maintaining distinctiveness.53 It was argued that affirmative action
for the so-called backward castes would further the cause of national unity:
The levelling of vertical disparities, it was suggested, would, better realize
the horizontal camaraderie of equal citizenship. One of the key arguments that
Bajpai makes in this part of the book is that the legitimation of affirmative action
for "backward castes" in terms that were consonant with-and indeed vital forthe requirements of national unity left such provisions on a more secure political
footing than religious, cultural, and educational rights for religious minorities,
which, although guaranteed as fundamental rights to all citizens, nonetheless carried an aura of majority largesse and have been vulnerable to right-wing Hindu
accusation of minority appeasement ever sinceY The premises and argumentative
pathways by which concepts are legitimated thus have enduring consequences for
their political survival.
The debate over group rights for religious minorities was reopened in
the 1980s in reaction to a controversial Supreme Court ruling in the case of
51.
52.
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MohammedAhmed Khan v Shah Bano." One of the legacies of the constitutional
settlement of group rights for religious minorities was that, in a continuation
of colonial practice, they would be governed by religious law insofar as issues of
personal law (marriage, divorce, adoption, and inheritance) were concerned. In
1985, the Supreme Court, in adjudicating an apparent conflict between Muslim
personal law and the secular Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) on the issue of
payment of maintenance (spousal support) by a Muslim man to his divorced
wife, ruled that the provisions of the CrPC applied to all citizens irrespective of
religion. 6 The Court also took it upon itself to offer an interpretation of Muslim
law that resolved the apparent conflict between the two sets of laws. 7 This latter
step was perceived by the (mostly male) leaders of the Muslim community as an
infringement of their religious freedom and provoked widespread agitation. In
response, the Congress government of Rajiv Gandhi passed The Muslim Women
(ProtectionofRights on Divorce)Act, 1986,8 overriding the judgment and exempting
Muslims from the ambit of the relevant provision of the CrPC. This was attacked
by the entire spectrum of political opposition and by women's groups as an
assault on secularism as well as on the rights of Muslim women, who were seen
as having been deprived of the protection of the CrPC insofar as spousal support
was concerned.59
Intriguingly, in the ensuing parliamentary debate, secularism was invoked both
in legitimation of, and in opposition to, the bill.6" Ironically, opposition invocations
of secularism echoed the Congress's own understanding of the concept in the
Constituent Assembly debates.61 In contrast, the Congress's conception of
secularism had shifted from one entailing the exclusion of religion from politics
to one of equal respect for all religions.62 Moreover, the Congress additionally
argued that minorities were entitled to a special degree of forbearance from the
state insofar as their religious life was concerned (and were also entitled to define
the scope of religion). Reform of personal law, if'it were ever to take place, had
to be initiated by minority communities themselves rather than at the behest of
the state. Contrasted with the Indian state's extensive reformation of Hindu law
in the 1950s, this argument was effectively a damning admission that the state
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could only legitimately claim to represent and act for Hindus.63 The recasting
of secularism in these terms was supported by shifts in understandings of
democracy as the representation of groups (rather than individuals) by members
of those groups. National unity was still central in the legitimating vocabulary
of group rights, but its requirements were construed very differently: while the
recognition of religious differences had been considered antithetical to national
unity in the Constituent Assembly debates, such recognition was now considered
necessary towards the same end. Bajpai suggests that this shift betrayed a more
pessimistic reading of the state's capacity to reshape society than had prevailed
in the heady days of the 1940s and 50s.6' Finally, the recasting of secularism as
religious freedom for groups was given a venerable genealogy by linking secularism
to putative ancient Hindu practices of accommodation as well as traditions
of cultural diversity that had prevailed in the subcontinent since antiquity. In
making arguments of this sort, even as it purported to act in defence of Muslim
religious freedom, the Congress was effectively widening the ideological space
for Hindu nationalism-a move that its ideological opponents in the BJP would
exploit to maximum effect over the next two decades.65
By the late 1970s, the Indian political landscape was being reshaped by the
emergence of an alliance of lower caste parties that were beginning to make the
case for an extension of caste-based quotas in government employment and
institutions of higher education to "Other Backward Classes" (OBCs-a residual
category of castes sandwiched between those considered upper caste and the
Scheduled Castes). These arguments came to a head in 1990 in the debate
surrounding the implementation of the Mandal Report, in which Prime Minister
V P Singh of the Janata Dal-led National Front coalition 66 recommended employment
and higher education quotas of 27 per cent for OBCs. Crucially, Bajpai argues
that social justice and democracy occupied relatively more important positions
in the legitimating vocabulary deployed to argue for OBC quotas, with national
unity declining in rhetorical priority.67 This change was supported by shifting
conceptions of equality and democracy. While earlier elaborations of equalityheavily informed by the imperatives of national unity-had understood it as
meaning non-discrimination between (i.e., identical treatment of) individuals,
with quotas seen as detracting from fairness to individuals, later interpretations
viewed it as requiring fair and equal opportunity, which could sometimes entail
63. Ibidat 197-98, 215.
64. Ibidat 209-10.
65. Ibidat 216.
66. Ibid at 228.
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treating differently situated agents dissimilarly.68 Conceptions of democracy were
increasingly linked to social justice, shifting from earlier, largely proceduralist
notions, to more participatory ones that took equality of outcomes more seriously.
Finally, the emphasis placed on empowering the oppressed by installing them in
positions of power as both a goal and a mechanism of social justice meant that
the discourse on OBC quotas was much less paternalistic than the analogous
69
debate at the time of the drafting of the Constitution.
The shifting place of national unity in the legitimating vocabulary of group
rights suggests that the intensity of cartographic anxiety has varied with time; yet
the variation has not been one of inexorable decline. Bajpai argues that in the
discourse of national parties such as the Congress and the BJP, social justice
continued to be seen as a means to the end of national unity. In contrst, the
discourse of the Janata Dal (JD) and other lower-caste parties treated social
justice as an end in itself.7" Indeed, when opposition parties pointed out that the
JD policy had triggered strife and instability, the JD responded that national
unity might temporarily have to be overridden in the interests of social justice.71
What is interesting about this observation is that it suggests that cartographic
anxiety was distributed unevenly amongst the political classes, being felt more
acutely by those parties portraying themselves as having an all-India base'and less
so by parties defining themselves more narrowly as representative of particular
castes: To be national is to be anxious about a very particular kind of cartography.
Among the many implications that Bajpai draws out of her analysis of the
conceptual shifts in arguments for OBC quotas is the observation that the third
front 72 ideological space has endured despite its political party fragmentation,
resisting absorption by either the Congress or the BJP precisely because the
imperative of national unity-so central to both those parties--occupies a much
more peripheral place in its philosophy. Yet, the downside of the failure to
construe social justice arguments as consonant with national unity and with a
vision of the common good is that affirmative action for OBCs remains vulnerable
to the charge that it is simply an opportunistic cultivation of "vote banks" rather
73
than a requirement of compensatory justice that is in the national interest.
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As with the other books reviewed here, Bajpai's work will speak to readers
with no particular interest in group rights in India. Throughout, Bajpai writes in
firm opposition to postcolonial and Marxist dismissals of liberalism; by unpacking the
ideological macro-unit that is liberalism into its conceptual elements, she reveals
it to be far more capacious and malleable than its critics' rather monolithic
renderings of it sometimes suggest. Liberalism, in her account, has been
both hostile to and accommodating of group rights depending on how its
conceptual components have been arranged relative to one another. Another general
theme running through Bajpai's book is an irritation with what she describes
as critical theory's "neo-orientalist fascination with 'indigenous' social forms
of religion, caste, and tribe" and consequent neglect of the extent to which
putatively Western liberal and democratic norms have taken root in everyday
76
Indian political discourse, well outside the social worlds of the urban elite.
Summarizing her argument, the author emphasizes that shifts in the trajectories
of group rights discourse have all taken place within the context of an enduring
legitimating vocabulary that has been predominantly liberal and democratic. The
increasing prominence of religion and caste in Indian political discourse, far from
repudiating liberal principles, has occurred in ways that use the normative and
institutional resources of liberal democracy and a modernist vocabulary of rights
and justice.75 In her view, these shifts occur not so much through the importation
of vernacular values as via a rearrangement of concepts in the core legitimating
vocabulary around which the system is structured.
I am not sure that the vernacular/Western distinction that Bajpai references
in this rather bland summation does justice to what is in fact an .extremely rich
and subtle book. There are a number of junctures at which Bajpai illustrates the
formation of an overlapping consensus on liberal democratic values through the
convergence of ideologically disparate strands of political opinion-for instance,
the opposition to political safeguards for minorities and the convergent usage
of a modernist vocabulary of secularism by both Hindu nationalists and liberal
modernists for utterly different reasons,76 or the use of Hindu beliefs regarding
the need to pay for the sins of one's ancestors in arguments about the justifiability
77
of affirmative action to remedy the historical injustice of caste discrimination.
To cite these articulations of indigenous beliefs in political discourse and their
occasional dressing up in liberal democratic clothing is not quite to say, as Ashis
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Nandy would, that non-modern values, concepts, and beliefs are better at
getting us to the professed goals of a modernity. 8 It is to say, rather, that the
capaciousness of liberal democratic concepts allows them to function as
placeholders for non-liberal, even illiberal, norms. This is of course a double-edged
potentiality, for it can both enable the accommodation of difference and clear
space for the operation of illiberal and intolerant values-indeed, both of these
possibilities are visible in this book.
The trajectories of Indian citizenship outlined in these books suggest that
there is no end to cartographic anxiety. Perhaps this is not surprising. If the
boundaries that constitute states are social institutions, they must continually be
reproduced by processes in which all states will remain heavily invested. But there
is something about the Indian trajectories reviewed here that suggests a qualitative
transformation in the nature of the anxiety underpinning these processes of
cartographic reproduction: The neurosis of the not-yet-nation has become that of
a not-yet-superpower. The historic shift from a foreign policy of non-alignment
to one of alliance with the world's only superpower has brought opportunities,
but also new threats.7 9 Not coincidentally, old animosities against the internal
and external Muslim Other have acquired paranoid global proportions, reflected
in the refraining of the Bangladeshi migrant 'threat.' As shown by the Naxalite
insurgency, seismic shifts in economic policy have exacerbated tensions around
land acquisition and resource exploitation, yet the imperative of maintaining the
high growth rates befitting an emerging power frequently trumps competing
considerations of equity. With growing power comes a growing ambition
to showcase oneself to the world. The curiously mixed collective paroxysm
of self-aggrandizement and self-doubt that surrounded India's hosting of the
Commonwealth Games in 2010 may be a sign of things to come. Only the
Olympics will do now: bigger, better, and more stressful. As for the Customs
Department, its officials no longer patiently stamp the pages of offending atlases.
On occasion, they obliterate maps by pasting slips of paper over them, as The
Economist discovered to its detriment in 2011.8 In a nuclear age, cartographic
anxiety has also, in a manner of speaking, gone ballistic.
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